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WRITING AS READING ITSELF: A DERRIDEAN 
READING OF LOST IN THE FUNHOUSE
Metin Boşnak




Lost in the Funhouse is like textbook illustration of Derrida’s views on language and 
writing. The book is both a guide for “how not to write” and “how not to define” 
writing, thus defying an ultimate center. Although the lack of a “proper” theme and 
heavy metafictional structure makes it “difficult to read”, it is a struggle to subvert 
the definitions of writing. The author deconstructs the conventional form and theme 
that is believed to be necessary for writing.  In this respect, Barth operates through 
the narratives like Derrida moves through ideas in history, and ending up with the 
conclusion that interplay is what matters rather than a fixed meaning.
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 Theory of language and writing in particular has proved to be a fundamental 
issue in modern times probably because communication at technical, diplomatic, 
philosophical levels has gained importance. Many of the modern ideas about writing, 
as about other issues, can certainly be traced back to Plato. Somehow, Plato has 
constructed a great system of thought, which philosophers inevitably have argued 
for and against to come up with a system of their own. In other words, though Plato 
has also synthesized ideas that were in the air before him, his system appears to 
encompass classical, modern and even post-modern ideas, and writing being one of 
them.
 Plato provides a background of mediocrity even today against which people 
argue as far as writing is concerned. It was a common idea from Plato to Saussure that 
writing functions as a documentation of speech, a substitute for it in its absence.  As 
speech has been seen as derivative of the thought, writing, similarly, has been seen 
as doubly derivative. Along with its secondary value to speech, writing’s materiality 
by itself was completely ignored, since it was only a representation of representation, 
which is reminiscent of Platonic concept of world of ideas. Saussure, for instance, 
believes the distinctiveness of language and writing systems, stating that the latter 
exists for the representing the former (Saussure, 1959, p. 23). He believes that there 
is an oral tradition independent from writing; hence, “purity” of speech is possible 
(Ibid., p. 24).
 The privileging of writing over speech was the classical understanding. 
However, Derrida rejects this hierarchy, noting that saying and hearing do not 
always correspond to each other, and that the speech is derivative. A term coined 
by Derrida, difference, meaning “to defer”, and homophone of the word difference 
meaning, “todiffer” illustrates this problem. Derrida asserts that it is not possible 
to distinguish the two words in speech; therefore, Saussure’s attempt to restrict the 
language to audible word is completely rejected. Therefore, his philosophy of writing 
undermines the Platonic one and those who agreed with Plato.
 In his essay, entitled “Différance” Derrida indicates that the signified always 
traces to different ‘signifieds’ while meaning is postponed each time through the 
constant deferral, which results in an endless chain of signifiers. According to him, 
there is no linear development and semantic center that totalize and harmonize 
the meaning; instead, there is “interplay ad infinitum” and “systematic play of 
differences.”Derrida rejects the logocentric sign systems completely. He believes 
that in the beginning, “man” was the center of the systems and orientation was 
towards the “humanity.” However, after a certain philosophical event, man ceased 
to be the center of the world, and everything is left to decentralization, giving way 
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to free play (Derrida, 1978, p. 278). Without a center, language is structured through 
the differences; therefore, absolute truth is not possible.
 The present paper will use Derrida’s theories to show the compatibility of the 
theory as applied to John Barth’s book, Lost in the Funhouse. Lost in the Funhouse is 
a post-structuralist short story collection, consisting of a maze of stories, in which 
the author forces the reader to get lost with him. In that sense, the book works 
like a textbook illustration of Derridean philosophy. In the book, the language’s 
documentary function is completely disregarded. There only remains a Funhouse 
consisting in a series of the floating signifiers. 
 Tony Tanner suggests that in Barth’s works, signs “become more important 
than their referents” and that he “plays with them in such a way that any established 
notions of the relationship between word and world are lost or called into doubt” 
(Tanner, 1974, p. 240). As Derrida suggests, writing’s function is not to transfer 
sounds into written words, it is a material by itself that functions in the signifying 
process. Likely, in his work, Barth does not provide a reflection of the real world. 
Apart from this, he constantly reminds the reader that this fiction is a maze of words 
and that the signification is an endless process. With his unconventional book, he 
forces the reader to understand that the world and literature are not necessarily one, 
and in fact, the reader is called in sometimes to write the text.
 With the use of metafiction, it is shown in the Lost in the Funhouse that 
language does not function to represent the world; it functions to prove that it has 
nothing to do with reality. By drawing attention to the language, the book prevents 
the reader from getting into the realm of the stories. The text is only a playground; 
it does not necessarily take the reader, author or narrator to anywhere. It wants to 
get readers lost in this playground, and indeed enjoy getting lost in this process by 
undermining the desire to reach a final point.
 As has been mentioned above, Derrida (1981) states that language consists of 
“systematic play of differences,” indicating that the sign is not the representation for 
meaning and that signifying process is a constant difference and deferral of signifiers 
instead of a final signified. The meaning is an endless game of tracing and it is 
constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which 
there is already a text, a network of textual referrals to other 
texts, a textual transformation in which each allegedly 
“simple term” is marked by the trace of another term, the 
presumed interiority of meaning is already worked upon by 
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its own exteriority. It always already carried outside itself. 
It already differs (from itself) before any act of expression 
(Ibid., p. 33).
 This is where intertextuality is come into being: it is the end of the linear 
structure and the birth of the interwovenness of the texts. Lost in the Funhouse is a 
good example of intertextuality, decentering and language as material rather than 
a teleological end. The book starts with “Frame Tale” a Mobius strip that suggests, 
“Once upon a time there was a story that began.” Each turn of the Mobius strip is 
a retelling of the same story that has already been told. Although it says the same 
thing, it indicates that it renews itself each time. In his work, The Play of the Double 
in Postmodern American Fiction, Gordon Slethaug depicts the frame tell as follows: 
Illustrat[ing] precisely Derrida’s view to identify the 
structurality of structure, whether in myth, literary form, 
or idea is thereafter to deny the desire for thematic center 
or presence. Space encircled by the Möbius strip is a 
nonlocus, a hole, a loss, the absence of a center or subject, a 
labyrinth, a universe of discourse where an infinite number 
of sign substitutions come into discourse where an infinite 
number of sign substitutions come into play, where nothing 
contains everything, and where a gap constitutes the subject 
(Slethaug, 1993, p. 138).
 This depiction of a Möbius strip seems to reflect endlessness of signifiers 
Derrida has suggested. Here, the Möbius strip is not a geometrical shape; it is a 
symbol of a theory, a symbol that is not absolute in the sense of stability. This shape 
is crafted out of the material of language; it is not a linear shape but in encloses 
the texts creating a new start for its each turn. It is both closed and endless. It is an 
intertext, a combination of the different tissues of all the texts that has been written. 
Along with its intertextuality, it contains endless possibilities.
 Also in the title story, the narrator Ambrose is in a funhouse where he 
encounters many images of himself reflected on the mirrors; however, there is no 
center, there is no “ultimate” image of himself that he can rely on. This frustration 
makes him unable to find a way out of the plight. He feels like “an odd detachment, 
as though someone else were the Master” (Barth, 1988, p. 81). The signifieds that he 
believes to own are lost since they give way to endless possibilities. Throughout the 
story, the narrator interrupts the narrative reminding that the story is not reaching 
a final point. For instance he says, “There’s no point in going farther; this isn’t going 
23  
Writing as Reading itself: A Derridean Reading of Lost in the Funhouse
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2015) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
anywhere; they haven’t even come to the funhouse yet.” In his story, Barth “risks 
meaning nothing.” Likewise, Derrida (1981) states: “To risk meaning nothing is to 
start to play, and first to enter into the play of différance which prevents any word, any 
concept, any major enunciation from coming to summarize and to govern from the 
theological presence of a center the movement and textual spacing of differences” 
(p. 14). In his book Derrida and Lacan: Another Writing, Michael Lewis, explains 
that:
The process of differentiating is the inscription of traces 
of the absence of one signifier in and as the presence of 
another. It is the process of archi-writing or archi-tracing. 
This will turn out to be all that we can know of that which 
is beyond language, that which is ‘real’: a mere (ability to) 
trace. Derrida is quite explicit that the ‘trace’ is the ‘remnant’, 
the slightest vestige of the real, which is (potentially) a much 
greater and stranger entity, with many more capacities 
(Lewis, 2008, p. 118).
 While the author “survives through,” trace he is also “effaced” through it 
(Dick and Wolfreys, 2013, p. 52). Ambrose, can only survive by writing: “This is 
what they call ‘passion.’ I am experiencing it” (Barth, 1988, p. 84). However, this 
trace does not make him present in the text: “How readily [Ambrose] deceived 
himself into supposing he was a person” (Ibid., p. 93). Ambrose is both present and 
absent in the text. The narrator says: “Is there really such a person as Ambrose[?]”
 Lost in the Funhouse is a self-reflexive novel that does not seek verisimilitude. 
The author constantly reminds himself to the reader, reveals the figures of speech and 
narrative techniques used in a way that turning clichés and used-upness into a story 
about story telling. Barth’s stories “constitutes a world unto itself, operating under 
laws of its own making” (Green, 1991, p. 229-242). The story of Echo’s linguistic 
structure is a good example: 
One does well to speak in the third person, the seer 
advises, in the manner of Theban Tiresias. A cure for self-
absorption is saturation: telling the story over as though 
it were another’s until like a much-repeated word it loses 
sense… Tiresias the prophet. What is he doing here? 
Conversing with Narcissus. How does he know-because 
he knows everything. … Tiresias can’t espy the unseeable, 
one may yet distinguish narrator from narrative, medium 
from message. … Considerable time has elapsed, it seems, 
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since seer and seeker, prophet and lost, first met in the cave 
(Barth, 1988, p. 98-102).
 It may be taking the life as a “raw material” but in Richard Poiriers words, it 
transforms language into a “world elsewhere” (Quoted in Green, 1991, p. 229-242). 
Language becomes a new world by itself. John Barth does not seek to convert the 
experience into a narrative, his effort is to create fiction world that is independent 
from reality. John Barth suspects that signifiers are able to represent the world and 
he believes that the playfulness of the words creates its own creative realm. 
 Lost in the Funhouse dismisses the fear that fiction is not able to reflect fully, 
because it is not its objective in the first place. John Barth interrupts the regularity of 
sentence pattern to break the myth of realism. He makes fun of the effort that aims 
to achieve realistic fiction and makes use of this as a subject. The stories are about 
“the possibility of humanizing play of language” (Ibid.). It is like fictionalizing the 
Différance process; making a story out of the endlessness of signifiers.This process 
itself emphasizes the value of form and language “for its own sake” (Ibid.). This 
technique is frequently used in the title story:
En route to Ocean City he sat in the back seat of the family 
car with his brother Peter, age fifteen, and Magda G —‘ age 
fourteen, a pretty girl and exquisite young lady, who lived not 
far from them on B — Street in the town of D —, Maryland. 
Initials, blanks, or both were often substituted for proper 
names in nineteenth-century fiction to enhance the illusion 
of reality. It is as if the author felt it necessary to delete the 
names for reasons of tact or legal liability. Interestingly, as 
with other aspects of realism, it is an illusion that is being 
enhanced, by purely artificial means. Is it likely, does it 
violate the principle of verisimilitude, that a thirteen-year-
old boy could make such a sophisticated observation? A girl 
of fourteen is the psychological coeval of a boy of fifteen 
or sixteen; a thirteen-year-old boy, therefore, even one 
precocious in some other respects, might be three years her 
emotional junior.
 John Barth suggests that “owing to the floating nature of language, meanings 
are untenable” (Tsai, 2003, p. 37-62). In Lost in the Funhouse, attempts for realistic 
depiction are frequently presented as problematic. For instance, in the book it goes: 
“To say that Ambrose’s and Peter’s mother was pretty is to accomplish nothing; 
25  
Writing as Reading itself: A Derridean Reading of Lost in the Funhouse
Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2015) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
the reader may acknowledge the preposition, but his imagination is not engaged. 
Besides, Magda was also pretty, yet in an altogether different way” (Barth, 1988, p. 
75). His half way depictions like “the brown hair on Ambrose’s mother’s forearms 
gleamed in the sun like” and “the smell of Uncle Karl’s cigar smoke reminded of ” 
(ibid, p. 74) indicate that the effort for achieving verisimilitude is vain.  
 Barth’s concerns are not only about the techniques used to achieve 
verisimilitude. He thinks “floating nature of language” also results from the lack of 
correspondence between the sign and the signified. As Derrida indicates, the signs 
only mean in relation to each other by differing and deferring; there is no absolute 
meaning of the signifiers. Likewise, Ambrose experiences this problem: “It was to 
be my fate to wonder at that moniker, relish it and revile it, ignore it, stare it out of 
countenance into hieroglyph and gibber, and come finally if not to embrace at least 
accept it with the cold neutrality of self-recognition . . .Knowing well that I and my 
sign are neither one nor quite two.” Derrida has a similar saying: “I love this name 
[Derrida], which is not mine of course (Branningan and Robbins, 1996, p. 219).
 Moreover, just as Derrida does, the book lays bare the problem of speech’s 
authority over writing. The story “Petition” illustrates the difference between life 
and language. In the story, there are Siamese twins, and the one attached on the 
backside writes a petition to the King to help him to get detached from his brother:
I am slight, my brother is gross. He’s incoherent but vocal. 
I’m articulate and mute. He’s ignorant but full of guile; I think 
I may call myself reasonably educated, and if ingenuous, 
no more so I hope than the run of scholars. My brother is 
gregarious: he deals with the public; earns and spends our 
income . . . For my part, I am by nature withdrawn, even 
solitary: an observer of life, a meditator, a taker of notes, 
and a dreamer if you will (Barth, 1988, p. 62).
 The Siamese twins, metaphorically refers to the written and oral manifestation 
of the language. Tony Tanner interprets that the “incoherent brother is like life itself, 
constantly shrugging off the attempts of language to circumscribe it within particular 
definitions. Language, in the form of the articulate brother, would be happy to 
pursue its inclination to ponder its elegant patterning in pure detachment from the 
soiling contacts of reality” (Tanner, 1974, p. 254). Such a distinction between life and 
language implicit in the relationship between the two brothers seems to correspond 
to Derrida’s comparison between “speech” and “writing” (Green, 1991, p. 229-242).
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 In Derrida’s thoughts, writing has been viewed as “clambering pick-a-back 
on the more authentic use of language” while speech [is seen as] language in action 
(Ibid.). The incoherent brother experiences life, he even has an intercourse with the 
other brother’s love, Thalia, while the petitioner brother follows him and experience 
everything secondarily only by watching. The correspondent in “Petition” must 
follow after his more active brother the speech as it has been dictated. However, 
the petitioner believes he has an advantage. “I can see him without seeing me; can 
therefore study and examine our bond, however to dissolve it, and take certain 
surreptitious measures to that end, such as writing this petition. Futile perhaps; 
desperate certainly” (Barth, 1988, p. 63). Writing contains the speech; however, it 
is not dependent on it. It has a world by itself.  Writing is not dependent on speech; 
speech is dependent on writing to stay alive. According to Green (1991), Barth’s 
story dramatizes Derrida’s characterization of writing as separate and secondary, 
but, through its very existence as a work of literary art … it also overcomes the 
specious opposition of speech and writing. Language in “Petition serves as both 
“elegant patterning” and direct expression, an affirmation of both art and “life.” 
More importantly, the need to affirm imaginative writing in this way--to overcome 
the “fear” so well represented by the story’s protagonist--becomes the true subject of 
the story (p. 229-242).
 As the forgoing has shown, Lost in the Funhouse is like textbook illustration 
of Derrida’s views on language and writing. The book is both a guide for “how not 
to write” and “how not to define” writing, thus defying an ultimate center. Although 
the lack of a “proper” theme and heavy metafictional structure makes it “difficult 
to read”, it is a struggle to subvert the definitions of writing. He deconstructs the 
conventional form and theme that is believed to be necessary for writing. In this 
respect, Barth operates through the narratives like Derrida moves through ideas in 
history, and ending up with the conclusion that interplay is what matters rather than 
a fixed meaning.
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